01184nas a2200157   4500008004100000020001400041245004200055210003800097260001200135300001400147490000800161520072600169100001800895700002500913856008800938       2000                        eng d  a0013-013300aThe Economics of Tenancy Rent Control0 aEconomics of Tenancy Rent Control  c2000///  a939 - 9620 v1103 a<p>We consider a rent control regime where rent increases on, and eviction of, a sitting tenant are forbidden. When apartments become vacant landlords may negotiate new rents. If inflation exists, landlords prefer to rent to short-staying tenants. Since departure-date-contingent contracts are forbidden and landlords cannot tell whether tenants are short-stayers, an adverse selection problem arises, with a Pareto inefficient equilibrium. When tenant types are determined endogenously, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is Pareto dominated. Abolition of the rent control regime, cannot only shift the equilibrium out of this inferior outcome, but also result in across-the-board lowering of rents.</p>1 aBasu, Kaushik1 aEmerson, Patrick, M.  uhttps://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/biblio/economics/economics-tenancy-rent-control